De Gaulle saw the British as 'Anglo-Saxons' , his peculiar ethnic category which also included those whom he called 'the Americans' (of the United States); and there was a penumbra of feeling that seemed to extend the term to cover those whom Churchill had called the English-speaking peoples. For de Gaulle, and for much of the French ruling class, the Anglo-Saxons were, and are, an 'Other' , an organism with a distinct ontogeny. For the less subtle minds of Britons and Americans, the universal 'Other' is 'foreigners' , of whom particular varieties may be identified as circumstances demand.
Sybilline rhetoric has always been the house style of great-power diplomacy at its best. It is the private language-game of international unpolitics -poetry in the service of pragmatism; and diplomacy-speak can itself be the threat or use of force by other means. Florid ideas of identity have always been used as a way of identifying and opposing an implied 'Other' and as weapons of raison d'état.
Such deep subjectivities have an unconscious dimension which affects the private minds of political and military leaders and, still more seriously, affects the public minds of whole societies. The hypothesis that the Protestant Reformation was a product of Martin Luther's painful health problems is as reasonable an hypothesis as any other. Diseases of the mind that form in the unconscious mind can infect the behaviour of world-historical figures and of whole societies, leading to war and genocide and ethnic cleaning and atrocities of every kind. And they can be the shadow-side of what may otherwise seem on the surface to be rational behaviour.
So it is that these collective subjectivities, deeply hidden and expressed in sophisticated linguistic codes, give its characteristic climate of inspissated indeterminacy to the intergovernmental world of 'nations' (genetic or generic subjectivities) and 'states' (major polities which may or may not be coterminous with a nation).
Diplomacy seems, in the notorious analogy, like a game of multidimensional chess played in a room without light, in which the outcomes are more serious than the immobilising of a king-symbol. The outcomes may determine millions of human lives and the future of the whole human world.
Anyone who has played the bizarre diplomatic game knows the intense intellectual and personal pleasure of playing the game well, however good or bad the outcomes. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose; that is what games are like. To go from the arena to the gallery is an experience of withdrawal from an addiction.
No one can say quite why the uk joined the European Communities in 1973 at the third attempt, and not at the other attempts, or quite why it joined at all. Nobody knows quite why any government ever does what it does, even that government itself, let alone other governments. Nobody, after the event, can
